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Combating the Control Signal Spoofing Attack in UAV Systems
Ke-Wen Huang, Hui-Ming Wang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system is vulnerable
to the control signal spoofing attack due to the openness of
the wireless communications. In this correspondence, a physical
layer approach is proposed to combat the control signal spoofing
attack, i.e,. to determine whether the received control signal
packet is from the ground control station (GCS) or a potential
malicious attacker (MA), which does not need to share any secret
key. We consider the worst case where the UAV does not have any
prior knowledge about the MA. Utilizing the channel feature of
the angles of arrival, the distance-based path loss, and the Rician-
κ factor, we construct a generalized log-likelihood radio (GLLR)
test framework to handle the problem. Accurate approximations
of the false alarm and successful detection rate are provided to
efficiently evaluate the performance.
Index Terms—Physical layer authentication, spoofing attack,
UAV system, generalized likelihood radio, false alarm rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years has witnessed the rapid development of the
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technique. Thanks to the high
flexibility of the UAV, it finds widespread applications in
both civilian and military fields [1]. In general, the UAV
will connect with the ground control station (GCS) through
wireless links for data and control signal exchanges. However,
due to the openness of the wireless environments, the UAV
systems are vulnerable to the control signal spoofing attacks
[3]. More specifically, a malicious attacker (MA) can forge the
control signal of the GCS to take over the UAV illegitimately,
which poses a serious threat to the safety of the UAV systems.
Therefore, identifying the source of the received signal at the
UAV-side (whether the GCS or any other MA) is of great
significance in the UAV systems, which motivates this work.
In this correspondence, we propose to utilize the charac-
teristics of the physical layer channels to combat the control
signal spoofing attack. We note that the characteristics of the
physical layer channels have already been used to cope with
the eavesdropping attack in both the terrestrial communication
systems, e.g., in [2], and the UAV communication systems,
e.g., in [4]–[6], but have not been specifically considered to
combat the control signal spoofing attack in the UAV systems.
The basic idea of the proposed method in this correspondence
comes from the fact that the wireless channels from the
GCS and a MA will be different significantly due to the
prominent distinction of propagation environments. The MA
is not able to imitate the channel characteristics of the GCS.
In general, using the parameters of the physical channel to
identify the signal source falls into the problem of physical
layer authentication (PLA), which has attracted widespread
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attention [7]–[11]. In these works, various channel parame-
ters, such as channel coefficients, power spectral, frequency
offsets, and multi-path delays are exploited to perform the
PLA. However, these methods are not specifically suitable for
the UAV ground-to-air authentication (GAA). In general, the
widely used Rayleigh fading channel model is not applicable
to the ground-to-air channel because the scatterers around the
UAV is generally sparse, and the ground-to-air channel usually
contains a strong line-of-sight (LOS) component. Furthermore,
the UAV is under control so some parameters relative to the
trajectory will be previously known. None of these UAV-
special features has been taken into account in above works. To
the best of our knowledge, using the physical layer approach
for control signal authentication in a UAV system does not
appear in existing literature.
In this correspondence, we design a physical-layer-based
method for the UAV to identify the source of the received
signal to combat the control signal spoofing attack. Utilizing
the angles of arrival, the distance-based path loss, and the
Rician-κ factor of the channel, we construct a generalized log-
likelihood radio (GLLR) test framework to recognize whether
the signal comes form the legitimate GCS or the illegitimate
MA. The contributions can be summarized as follows: 1) the
GAA problem is considered under the worst case where no
prior knowledge of the MA is obtained at the UAV-side; 2)
we propose a generalized log-likelihood radio (GLLR) test
method to handle the GAA problem, wherein the unknown
channel parameters are first estimated; and 3) we perform com-
prehensive analysis to evaluate the authentication performance,
where accurate approximations for the false alarm rate (FAR)
and successful detection rate (SDR) are derived.
Notations: (·)T and (·)H denote the transpose and conjugate
transpose, respectively. CL denotes the space of L-dimensional
column vector. The complex Gaussian distribution is denoted
by CN (m,R) with m and R being the mean vector and
covariance matrix, respectively. G (a, b) means the Gamma
distribution with a and b denoting the shape and scale param-
eters, respectively. v(i,j), for j > i, denotes a vector which is
comprised of the ith, (i+ 1)th, · · · , jth elements in vector v.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A comprehensive system model is provided in Fig. 1, which
consists of a multi-antenna UAV with L antennas, a single
antenna GCS, and a single antenna MA. The UAV is under
the control of the GCS and the MA performs control signal
spoofing attack by sending a deceitful control signal which
follows exact the same format of the real control signal. We
note that in this correspondence, we only consider a single
MA for simplicity. The cases with multiple MAs are generally
complicated and thus left for future research. For simplicity
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Fig. 1: System Model.
and clarity, all the parameters in this paper that are labeled
with subscript 0 (1) means that they are associated with the
GCS (MA).
For i ∈ {0, 1}, assume that the azimuth and zenith angles
of arrival of the control signal at the UAV are denoted by
(θi, φi), then the ground-to-air channels are given by fi ,
d
−α/2
i
(√
1/(1 + κi)ai +
√
κi/(1 + κi)hi
)
∈ CL, where α
is the exponential path loss factor, di denotes the distance,
κi is the Rician-κ factor, ai , a (ωi, µi), satisfying ‖ai‖2 =
L, is the steering vector of the antenna array 1 with ωi ,
sin (θi) cos (φi) and µi , sin (θi) sin (φi), which composes
the LOS component of the channel, and hi follows CN (0, IL)
which composes the non-LOS component of the channel. For
notational simplicity, we define λi ,
√
1/(1 + κi) and δi ,√
1− λ2i 2.
Since the UAV is under the control of the GCS and
the trajectory will be known a priori, we assume the UAV
has the prior knowledge of the GCS at some instance, i.e.,
{d0, λ0, ω0, µ0}, but does not know {d1, λ1, ω1, µ1} of the
MA. The GAA problem here is that after receiving a con-
trol signal packet, the UAV need to determine whether this
packet is sent by the GCS based on its prior knowledge on
{d0, λ0, ω0, µ0}.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
We provide our PLA scheme in this section. Assume
each received packet includes a previously known training
sequence, denoted by s ∈ CLs , where Ls is the sequence
length. In general, the training sequence is used to estimate the
instantaneous channel, which can be further used to identify
the signal source because different locations have different
channels. Without loss of generality, we assume that ‖s‖2 = 1.
The received training sequence at the UAV is written as
Y ,
{√
P0f0s
H +N , H0,√
P1f1s
Hejψ +N , H1,
(1)
where H0 (H1) denotes the hypothesis that the packet is sent
by the GCS (MA), Pi denotes the transmit power, N is the
noise with each of its element following CN (0, σ2N), and ψ
1The specific form of the steering vector, i.e., a(ω, µ), is provided in
simulation part in Section IV.
2The system model can be further extended to the cases where the GCS
and the MA are equipped with multiple antennas. In fact, after performing
the beamforming, the multi-antenna GCS and the multi-antenna MA degrade
to a single-antenna GCS and a single-antenna MA, respectively. As for the
UAV, our model requires that the UAV is equipped with a two-dimensional
array to insure that the physical channel is a function of both the azimuth and
zenith angles of arrival.
is a phase rotation set by the MA which is unknown by the
UAV. Matching Y with s, we obtain
y , Y s =
{√
P0d
−α/2
0 (λ0a0 + δ0h0) + n, H0,√
P1d
−α/2
1 (λ1a1 + δ1h1) e
jψ + n, H1,
where we have n ,Ns ∼ CN (0, σ2IL) with σ2 = σ2N/Ls.
We assume here that P0 is known by the UAV but P1 is not.
Once obtain y, we propose to check the GLLR to determine
the source of the received signal, either the GCS or the MA.
The GLLR test is given by
T ,
1
L
ln
max
I1,ψ
f (y|H1, I1, ψ)
f (y|H0, I0) R
H1
H0
τ, (2)
where Ii = {Pi, di, λi, ωi, µi} for i ∈ {0, 1}, and τ is the
decision threshold.
As we can see from (2), the basic steps of the GLLR test is
that we first estimate the unknown {P1, d1, λ1, ω1, µ1, ψ} from
y according to the maximum likelihood criterion by assuming
that H1 is true. Then, the probability density function (PDF)
of y conditioned on H0 is compared with the maximized PDF
of y condition on H1 through the log-likelihood function. The
final decision between H0 and H1 depends on the obtained
log-likelihood radio T and the decision threshold τ .
In the following part of this section, we first provide the
estimation result of {P1, d1, λ1, ω1, µ1, ψ}. After that, a semi-
closed form approximation of the FAR are proposed to effi-
ciently determine the decision threshold τ . Finally, we provide
an approximation of the SDR to evaluate the performance of
the proposed authentication method.
A. Parameter Estimation
In this subsection, we derive the estimation result of the un-
known {P1, d1, λ1, ω1, µ1, ψ} in (2), which is an indispensable
step to check the GLLR.
If H1 is true, y follows CN
(
x1λ1a1e
jψ, ǫ21IL
)
, where
x1 ,
√
P1d
−α/2
1 . We observe that P1 is always coupled with
d1 in the form of
√
P1d
−α/2
1 . Therefore it is sufficient to
only estimate x1, instead of estimating both P1 and d1. The
maximum likelihood estimation of {x1, λ1, ω1, µ1, ψ} can be
written as a maximization problem given by
{x∗1, λ∗1, ω∗1 , µ∗1, ψ∗} = argmax
x,λ,ω,µ,ψ
ln f (y|H1, x, λ, ω, µ, ψ)
(3)
where y¯ , y/
√
L and a¯ (ω, µ) , a (ω, µ) /
√
L. The estima-
tion results are provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The solution of (3) is given as follows
(ω∗1 , µ
∗
1) = argmax
ω,µ
∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣2 , (4a)
x∗1 =
{
‖y¯‖2 − σ2, if Ξ∗ ≥ 0,∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω∗1 , µ∗1)∣∣2 , if Ξ∗ < 0, (4b)
(λ∗1)
2 =
{(
‖y¯‖2 − σ2
)
/
∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω∗1 , µ∗1)∣∣2 , if Ξ∗ ≥ 0,
1, if Ξ∗ < 0,
(4c)
e−jψ
∗
= y¯H a¯ (ω∗1 , µ
∗
1) /
∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω∗1 , µ∗1)∣∣ , (4d)
3where y¯ , y/
√
L, a¯ (ω, µ) , a (ω, µ) /
√
L, and Ξ∗ ,
‖y¯‖2 − ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω∗1 , µ∗1)∣∣2 − σ2 and the value of (ω∗1 , µ∗1) can
be extensively searched within the region of (−1, 1)× (−1, 1)
in a two-dimensional real space.
Proof. To solve (3), our basic idea is that we first derive
the expression of x1, λ1, ψ with respect to (ω, µ), denoted
by x1 (ω, µ), λ1 (ω, µ), and ψ (ω, µ). Then, we only need to
search for (ω∗1 , µ
∗
1). Based on (3), we first solve
(x1 (ω, µ) , λ1 (ω, µ) , ψ (ω, µ))
= argmin
x,λ,ψ


∥∥y¯ − xλa¯ (ω, µ) ejψ∥∥2
x2 (1− λ2) + σ2
+ ln
(
x2
(
1− λ2)+ σ2)

 . (5)
Obviously from (5), we obtain that
ψ (ω, µ) = argmin
ψ
∥∥y¯ − xλa¯ (ω, µ) ejψ∥∥2
⇒ e−jψ(ω,µ) = y¯H a¯ (ω, µ) / ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣ . (6)
Inserting (6) into (5), we have
(x1 (ω, µ) , λ1 (ω, µ))
= argmin
x,λ


‖y¯‖2 + x2λ2 − 2xλ ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣
x2 (1− λ2) + σ2
+ ln
(
x2
(
1− λ2)+ σ2)

 . (7)
To solve (7), we make a change of the variables: x→ x and
λx → z. Note that within {x > 0, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1}, this is an
one-to-one map. Therefore, it is equivalent to solve
min
0≤z≤x


‖y¯‖2 + z2 − 2z ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣
x2 − z2 + σ2
+ ln
(
x2 − z2 + σ2)

 . (8)
We further make a change of variables: z → z and x2−z2 → t.
Note that, in the region of 0 ≤ z ≤ x, this is still an one-to-one
map, and therefore, (8) is equivalent to
min
t≥0,z≥0
‖y¯‖2 + z2 − 2z ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣
t+ σ2
+ ln
(
t+ σ2
)
. (9)
From (9), it is obviously that z (ω, µ) =
∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣.
Substituting z (ω, µ) into (9) directly leads to
t (ω, µ) = argmin
t>0
‖y¯‖2 − ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣2
t+ σ2
+ ln
(
t+ σ2
)
=
{
‖y¯‖2 − ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣2 − σ2, if Ξ (ω, µ) ≥ 0,
0, if Ξ (ω, µ) < 0,
(10)
where Ξ (ω, µ) , ‖y¯‖2 − ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣2 − σ2. Based on
z (ω, µ) and t (ω, µ), we can obtain the expressions for
x1 (ω, µ) and λ1 (ω, µ). Inserting x1 (ω, µ), λ1 (ω, µ) and
ψ (ω, µ) into (3), we finally obtain that
(ω∗1 , µ
∗
1) = argmax
−1≤ω≤1,−1≤µ≤1
∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣2 . (11)
Substituting (ω∗1 , µ
∗
1) into x1 (ω, µ), λ1 (ω, µ), ψ (ω, µ), we
can obtain (4).
Inserting (4) into (2), the GLLR test can be simplified as
T =
‖y¯ − α0a¯0‖2
ǫ20
− ln
‖y¯‖2 − (max
ω,µ
∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω, µ)∣∣2 )
ǫ20
RH1H0 τ, (12)
where for notational simplicity, we define αi ,
√
Pid
−α/2
i λi
and ǫ2i , Pid
−α
i δ
2
i + σ
2, for i ∈ {0, 1}. Note that in (12),
we only consider the cases where Ξ∗ ≥ 0. We emphasize
that this is a reasonable assumption because: 1) when λ < 1,
‖y¯‖2 − ∣∣y¯H a¯ (ω∗, µ∗)∣∣2 > 0 with probability one, and 2) the
noise power, i.e., σ2, can be significantly reduced by increasing
the length of training sequence. From (12), we can see that the
computational complexity of the GLLR test mainly depends
on the two-dimensional searching of (ω∗, µ∗). For a given
searching step size in each dimension, denoted by ι, then the
whole complexity is around o
(
1/ι2
)
. Now, based on (12),
we need to design a proper decision threshold τ to ensure a
satisfying authentication performance, which will be discussed
in the following subsection.
B. Decision Threshold Design
In the proposed system, it is hard to evaluate the Bayesian
decision risk because the prior knowledge about the MA is
generally absent. Therefore, we resort to the Neyman-Pearson
criterion [12] to determine the decision threshold. Namely,
τ is chosen such that the FAR is fixed to some value η,
i.e., PFA (τ) , P {T > τ |H0} = η. However, the exact
distribution of T is very hard to obtain due to the fact it
involves an exhaustive two-dimensional searching and there
is no closed-form for the calculation of T . This means that it
is even harder to obtain an analytical expression for the FAR.
To handle this problem, a computationally much more efficient
approximation of the FAR is provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Conditioned on H0, the complementary cu-
mulative distribution function (CCDF) of T in (12) can be
approximated by the CCDF of T˜FAk , Xk + Yk − lnYk
in the sense that they have a common lower bound, where
Xk ∼ G (k, 1/L), Yk ∼ G (L− k, 1/L), and k can be any
integer within {2, 3, · · · , L− 1}.
Proof. The basic idea for the proof is that we first find a lower
bound on T , and then we proof that T˜FAk is also larger than
the lower bound. Conditioned on H0, we have
T ≥ ∥∥ˆ¯g0∥∥2 − ln(∥∥ˆ¯y∥∥2 − ∣∣ˆ¯yH a¯0∣∣2) (a)= ‖u‖2 − ln ∥∥u(2,L)∥∥2
≤ T˜FAk , ‖u‖2 − ln
∥∥u(k+1,L)∥∥2 ,
=
∥∥u(1,k)∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Xk
+
∥∥u(k+1,L)∥∥2 − ln ∥∥u(k+1,L)∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Yk−lnYk
,
where ˆ¯g0 , (y¯ − α0a¯0) /ǫ0, and step (a) is obtain by defining
u , [u1, u2, · · · , uL]H = UH0 ˆ¯g0 ∼ CN
(
0, 1LI
)
, and U0 ,
[a¯0, b0,1, b0,2, · · · , b0,L−1] being a unitary matrix.
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Fig. 2: SDR v.s. FAR, where λ20 = 0.8.
Based on Lemma 1, we can use 1 − P{T˜FAk < τ} as an
approximation of PFA (τ), where we have
P{T˜FAk < τ} =
LL
Γ(k)Γ(L − k)
k−1∑
j=0
(
k − 1
j
)
(−1)k−j−1
×
(
γ
(
L− 1, L; q, q)
L− j − 1 −
γ
(
j, j + 1; q, q
)
e(L−j−1)τ (L− j − 1)
)
, (13)
with q and q denoting the roots of ex−τ = x within [τ,+∞)
and (0, τ ], respectively, and γ (n, a; b, c) ,
∫ c
b
xne−axdx =∑n
j=0
n!
(n−j)!aj+1
(
bn−je−ab − cn−je−ac). The derivation of
P{T˜FAk < τ} is provided in Appendix. Searching τ˜ that
satisfies P{T˜FAk > τ˜} = η, we can obtain an approximation
of τ that satisfies the FAR constraint. We have to emphasize
here that though P{T˜FAk > τ} is neither an upper bound nor a
lower bound of the FAR, it serves as an approximation of FAR
with high accuracy, which will be shown in the simulations.
C. SDR Evaluation
We now provide the performance evaluation of the above
method by deriving the SDR in this subsection. We have to
point out that the exact SDR is hard to obtain due to the
complicated form of T . To efficiently check the authentication
performance, we have the following lemma, which provides
an approximation of the SDR.
Lemma 2. For a given position of the MA, conditioned on
H1, the CCDF of T can be approximated by the CCDF of
T˜ SD , X˜ + Y˜ − ln Y˜ in the sense that they have a common
lower bound, where Y˜ ∼ G (L− 2, 1/̺), and X˜ is a scaled
non-centric chi-square random variable whose PDF is
fX˜ (x) = (̺/ ‖β‖)
√
xe−̺(x+‖β‖
2)I1
(
2̺
√
x
)
I {x > 0} ,
with Iv(x) being the modified bessel function of first kind with
order v, I{·} being the indicator function, ̺ , ǫ20L/ǫ21, β ,
[β1, · · · , βL]T = UH1 ∆, U1 , [a¯1, b1,1, b1,2, · · · , b1,L−1]
being a unitary matrix, and ∆ , (1/ǫ0)(α1a¯1ejψ − α0a¯0).
Proof. Conditioned on H1, we have
T ≥ ∥∥ˆ¯g1 +∆∥∥2 − ln(∥∥ˆ¯y∥∥2 − ∣∣ˆ¯yH a¯1∣∣2)
(a)
= ‖β + v‖2 − ln ∥∥v(2,L)∥∥2
(b)
= |β1 + v1|2 + |ρ+ z2|2 +
∥∥z(2,L−1)∥∥2 − ln ‖z‖2
≤ T˜ SD
, |β1 + v1|2 + |ρ+ z2|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
,X˜
+
∥∥z(2,L−1)∥∥2 − ln ∥∥z(2,L−1)∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Y˜−ln Y˜
,
where ˆ¯g1 , (1/ǫ0)(y¯ − α1a¯1ejψ) ∼ CN (0, (1/̺)IL),
ˆ¯y , (1/ǫ0)y¯, step (a) is obtained by v ,
[v1, v2, · · · , vL]T = UH1 ˆ¯g1 ∼ CN (0, (1/̺)IL),
and step (b) is obtained by ρ ,
∥∥β(2,L)∥∥,
z , [z2, z3, · · · , zL]T = UˇH1 v(2,L) ∼ CN (0, (1/̺)IL−1),
and Uˇ1 , [β(2,L)/
∥∥β(2,L)∥∥ , c2, · · · , cL−1] being a unitary
matrix.
Based on Theorem 2, we can use P{T˜ SD > τ} to approx-
imate the SDR. The calculation of P{T˜ SD > τ} is provided
in (14) on the top of next page. The derivation of (14) is
quite similar to that of (13) in Appendix, and thus the detailed
steps are omitted. In the simulation part, we will show that the
proposed approximation in (14) is very accurate to evaluate the
SDR.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical results to
show the performance of the proposed authentication method.
We assume the UAV is equipped with a T-shaped ar-
ray, with 2M + 1 antennas placed along x-axis and
N antennas placed along y-axis. We assume the adja-
cent antennas are separated by half of a wavelength.
Then, we have a (ωi, µi) = [aX (ωi)
T ,aY (µi)
T ]T where
aX (x) = [e
jMπx, · · · , 1, · · · , e−jMπx]T , and aY (x) =
[e−jπx, · · · , e−jNπx]T . In the simulation, we set σ2 = 0.01
mW, M = 6, N = 12, and the UAV is at the height of
20 m. Under H0, we set θ0 = 15◦,φ0 = 30◦,P0 = 20 dBm.
UnderH1, the corresponding parameters are the same as those
under H0 unless specified. The estimations of ω1 and µ1 in
(4a) are obtained by extensively searching with step size given
by 0.005.
In Fig. 2, the receiver operating characteristic curves are
plotted under some given positions of the MA. The approxi-
mations of the SDR and the FAR are obtained by using the
CCDF of T˜ SD and T˜FA2 , respectively. As we can see, the ap-
proximation results can accurately approximate the simulation
results.
In Fig. 3, we plot the SDRs against some key physical
layer parameters of the MA, i.e., θ1, φ1, λ
2
1, and P1, while
the FARs are fixed as 0.02, 0.05, and 0.1. In Fig. 3(a)
and Fig. 3(b), we show that with (θ1, φ1) deviating from
(θ0, φ0), the SDRs get improved. This is because the spoofing
signal comes from an undesired direction which leads to
the mismatch of the estimated and the desired directions of
arrival. However, if (θ1, φ1) closely approaches (θ0, φ0), the
SDRs decline sharply due to the limited spatial resolution.
In Fig. 3(c), we show that for a given location of the MA,
the SDRs increase if λ1 gets distinct from λ0. In fact, the
value of λi, for i ∈ {0, 1}, influences the strength of the LOS
and the non-LOS components of the corresponding physical
channel. When λ1 is significantly distinct from λ0, then the
ratio between the LOS and non-LOS signal powers of the
5P
{
T˜ SD > τ
}
= 1−
∫∫
x+y−ln y<τ
fX˜(x)fY˜ (y)dydx = 1−
∫ q
q
∫ u
eu−τ
fX˜(u− v)fY˜ (v)dvdu
= 1− ̺
2
‖β‖e
−̺‖β‖2 ̺
L−2
Γ(L− 2)
+∞∑
k=0
̺2k
k!Γ(k + 2)
∫ q
q
∫ u
eu−τ
(u− v)k+1vL−3e−̺udvdu
= 1− ̺
2
‖β‖e
−̺‖β‖2 ̺
L−2
Γ(L− 2)
+∞∑
k=0
̺2k
k!Γ(k + 2)
k+1∑
j=0
(
k + 1
j
)
(−1)k+1−j
× γ(k + L− 1, ̺; q, q)− e
−(k−j+L−1)τγ(j, ̺+ j + 1− k − L; q, q)
k − j + L− 1 . (14)
P
{
T˜FAk < τ
}
= P {Xk + Yk − lnYk < τ} (a)=
∫ q
q
∫ u
eu−τ
fXk,Yk(u − v, v)dvdu
(b)
=
LL
Γ(k)Γ(L− k)
k−1∑
j=0
(
k − 1
j
)
(−1)k−j−1
∫ q
q
uje−Lu
∫ u
eu−τ
vL−j−2dvdu
(c)
= Eqn. (13). (15)
(a) SDR v.s. θ1, where λ
2
0
= 0.8. (b) SDR v.s. φ1, where λ20 = 0.8.
(c) SDR v.s. λ2
1
, where λ2
0
= 0.85
and θ1 = 16◦.
(d) SDR v.s. P1, where λ
2
0
= 0.85
and φ1 = 34◦.
Fig. 3: SDR under fixed FAR.
spoofing control signal from the MA will not coincide with
that of the real control signal from the GCS. In practice, the
Rician-κ factors are different at different locations, which can
be utilized to improve the authentication performance. In Fig.
3(d), we plot the SDRs versus the transmit powers of the MA.
In the simulation, the distances from the UAV to the GCA and
the MA are the same. It can be observed that the lowest SDR
appears under the cases when P0 = P1. This is because the
deviation of P1 from P0 will increase or decrease the total
received power at the UAV and thus becomes more possible
to be successfully detected.
V. CONCLUSION
In this correspondence, we focused on the authentication at
the UAV-side by considering a MA transmitting forged control
signal to pretend as the legitimate GCS. We considered the
worst case where the UAV has no prior knowledge of the MA.
We proposed a GLLR-based authentication method in this
paper. The exact FAR and SDR were hard to obtain due to the
complicated form of the GLLR. To evaluate the authentication
performance, accurate approximations were provided.
APPENDIX
The derivation of P{T˜FAk < τ} is provided in (15) on the
top of this page, where step (a) is obtained by x+y → u and
y → v, and step (b) is obtained by using binomial expansion,
and step (c) is obtained by first integrating with respect to v
and then following the definition of γ(n, a; b, c).
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